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Over the past 50 or so years, I have been concerned with the qual-
ity of economic forecasts and have written both about the procedures 
for evaluating these predictions and the results that were obtained from 
these evaluations. In this chapter I provide some perspectives on the 
issues involved in judging the quality of these forecasts. These include 
the reasons for evaluating forecasts, the questions that have been asked 
in these evaluations, the statistical tools that have been used, and the 
generally accepted results. (I do also present some new material that has 
not yet been published.) I do this in two parts: fi rst focusing on short-
run gross domestic product (GDP) and infl ation predictions and then 
turning to labor market forecasts.
The process of forecasting involves a number of sequential steps. 
Part of that process is concerned with evaluating either the forecasts 
themselves or the methods that generated the predictions. This evalua-
tion may occur either when past forecasts are examined prior to preparing 
the next one or in a postmortem session to determine what went wrong 
and what can be learned from the errors. However, there are different 
perspectives or approaches for conducting these examinations. These 
differences may occur because some forecasts are model-based while 
others are derived primarily from the judgmental approach. There is a 
second issue. Originally, the evaluations were concerned with judging a 
particular model or individual. A more recent development has been to 
determine the value that the forecast has for the users of that prediction. 
The original approach calculated a variety of statistics that mea-
sured the errors of the forecasts and then compared these errors with 
those generated by alternative methods or individuals. The newer ap-
proach for forecast evaluation is to base it on the loss functions of the 
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users (Pesaran and Skouras 2002). Elliott and Timmermann (2008), 
in summarizing the theoretical literature on how to evaluate forecasts, 
take the same approach. These studies defi nitely suggest that the pre-
ferred evaluation methodology utilize decision-based methods; Pesaran 
and Skouras, however, note that it has had limited use, and that most 
studies have focused on statistical measures to evaluate the skills of the 
forecaster or the accuracy of the model.1 There are many reasons why 
the decision-based methods have not been used, including technical dif-
fi culties and the huge amount of data required to describe the decision 
environment, particularly the loss functions of the users.
The theoretical procedures provide the guidelines for undertaking 
forecast evaluations, but since there are problems in applying them, 
they have not yet yielded much information about the quality of the 
forecasts or an understanding of the types of errors that occur or their 
causes. Even though we cannot, in general, evaluate the cost of the 
forecast errors in the context of decision functions, I will present one 
particular result where it was possible to use this approach.2
Statistical measures have been the most common method for evalu-
ating forecasts, and they have provided many insights about the quality 
of the forecasts and their limitations. I will, therefore, focus on that 
approach. These measures also provide us with the ability to obtain 
information about the forecasting process and why particular errors oc-
curred. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. I fi rst present a list of questions 
that should be addressed in any evaluation of macroeconomic forecasts; 
this list was taken from an old paper of mine (Stekler 1991a). That pa-
per also presented the statistical methods that could be used to address 
those questions. In the intervening 20 years, forecasters have both de-
veloped new techniques for answering the original questions and asked 
additional questions. I will discuss these in the context of the original 
questions.
Our macroeconomic forecast evaluations have primarily been con-
cerned with the predictions of GDP growth and infl ation. I will, therefore, 
summarize some of the fi ndings relating to these two variables. In mak-
ing macro forecasts, economists also estimate the unemployment rate, 
but these forecasts have not been analyzed as extensively. Consequently, 
there is a limited amount of information about the quality of these 
forecasts.
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Moreover, in analyzing labor markets in a macroeconomic growth 
context, long-term projections of annual employment by industry and 
occupation are sometimes also issued. Not as much attention has been 
paid to the procedures for evaluating these projections. I will present 
some fi ndings about these forecasts, utilizing a statistic that has not 
conventionally been used in evaluations. There are also many types of 
regional forecasts, but I will only discuss the population projections of 
the Census Bureau. I conclude with a summary of the fi ndings and sug-
gest topics that warrant further research.
QUESTIONS ADDRESSED IN MACROECONOMIC
FORECAST EVALUATIONS
In 1991, I asked a number of questions, some of which are related, 
that can be and have been used in forecast evaluations (Stekler 1991a). 
These questions are all statistical in nature and describe the character-
istics of the forecasting method or the particular forecaster. The main 
questions are
• How good is Method A (Forecaster X)?
• Do the forecasts show systematic errors?
• Are all methods (forecasters) equally good?
• Is Method A (Forecaster X) signifi cantly better than Method 
B (Forecaster Y)?
• Does Forecast M contain information not in Forecast N? 
• Does Forecaster X produce forecasts that are useful to users?
How Good is Method A (Forecaster X)? 
If the forecasts are quantitative, the fi rst question is answered by 
using some error metric, usually mean square error or mean square 
percentage error, and comparing it with the similar error metric of a 
benchmark or naive model.3 On the other hand, different procedures are 
used to assess nonquantitative macroeconomic forecasting techniques, 
which are primarily concerned with predicting whether a cyclical turn 
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will occur. These forecasting methods are based on indicators. Originally, 
rules were used for determining whether an indicator was signaling a 
turn. (See Stekler 1991b.) More recently, models that predict the prob-
ability of a cyclical turn have been developed, and probability scoring 
rules such as the Brier Score have been used to evaluate these forecasts. 
Further analysis of these qualitative forecasts is beyond the scope of 
this paper.
Bias and Effi ciency
Accurate forecasts should be unbiased (not have systematic errors) 
and should use all available information. Bias and effi ciency tests are 
used to determine whether there are systematic errors. These tests are 
usually derived from the Mincer-Zarnowitz equation:  
(6.1a)  At = α + β Ft + et  , where                                      
 
 At and Ft refer to the actual and forecast values (Mincer and Zarnowitz 
1969). The condition for unbiasedness and weak form effi ciency is that 
α = 0 and β = 1. An alternative test for bias is 
(6.1b) At − β Ft  = c + et  ,      
 
with the null that c = 0 (Holden and Peel 1990). These tests are applied 
to one individual’s forecasts at one horizon. 
A newer and more sophisticated methodology has been developed 
by Davies and Lahiri (1995, 1999) and has been applied to surveys 
that contain the forecasts of many individuals or organizations, e.g., 
the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) or Blue Chip Forecasters. 
The use of this methodology permits an analysis of multidimensional 
forecasts, i.e., many forecasters each making a prediction for a target 
year at several horizons.4 The errors can be decomposed as
(6.2a)  At − Fith  =  Φi + λth + eith  
  
and 
      
(6.2b)  λth  = ∑ utj , where                                            
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Fith  is the forecast made by the ith forecaster for year t at an h month 
horizon, Φi  represents the specifi c bias of each individual, and λth repre-
sents the shocks that were not anticipated. This model can identify the 
specifi c sources of each forecaster’s errors.
Using the Davies-Lahiri methodology it is no longer necessary to 
confi ne the evaluation of the predictions obtained from a survey to the 
“consensus” forecast. It has the inherent advantage that the opposing 
biases of individuals can make the mean (median) forecast look unbi-
ased even when, in fact, the individual forecasts from which the mean 
is calculated are all biased.
Comparing Forecasters and Benchmarks
Nonparametric procedures have been used to determine whether 
all forecasters are equally accurate. For each set of forecasts, the er-
rors of each forecaster are ranked according to their accuracy. If the 
accuracy of all forecasters were equal, their rankings would have the 
same expected values. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis that all 
forecasters have equal rankings (and are equally good). The chi-square 
goodness-of-fi t test statistic, x2, is used. (See Batchelor 1990.)
The fourth question asks whether a particular method (forecaster) 
is signifi cantly more accurate than another method (forecaster). Origi-
nally, Theil’s U coeffi cient was the basis of comparison:
(6.3)  U = √ (ef,t)2/ √ (en,t)2  ,       
                                                                        
where (ef,t) is the error of the forecast that is being evaluated and (en,t) is 
the error of the naive benchmark. This naive model can be either a no-
change or the same change as the last period prediction. At a minimum, 
the forecasts should be more accurate than naive models and U must 
be less than 1. Statistical models, such as ARIMA, have also been used 
as benchmarks, and new statistics for comparing models have been 
developed.
Currently the Diebold-Mariano (DM) statistic is the preferred meth-
odology for testing whether there is a statistically signifi cant difference in 
accuracy between any two sets of forecasts (Diebold and Mariano 1995). 
That statistic (Equation 6.4) has been modifi ed by Harvey, Leybourne, 
up11mhaiefch6.indd   109 11/17/2011   3:04:57 PM
110   Stekler
and Newbold (1997), and their modifi cation has resulted in an improve-
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(6.4)                    ,
where h is the horizon, d is the mean absolute difference of the pre-
diction errors, ˆ( )V d  is the estimated variance, S1 is the original DM 
statistic, and *1S  is the modifi ed DM statistic. The modifi ed DM test 
statistic is estimated with Newey-West corrected standard errors that 
allow for heteroskedastic autocorrelated errors (Newey and West 1987).
Several procedures have been developed to determine whether 
one forecast contains information not embodied in another procedure. 
One involves combining the two sets of forecasts. If the variance of 
the combined forecasts is not signifi cantly less than the variance of the 
prediction that is being analyzed, then this particular forecast does not 
contain additional useful information. This analysis is similar to the 
concept of encompassing, where a model that encompasses another 
contains the information of the latter.
Directional Accuracy: A New Approach
Even though the analysis does not directly use utility functions, 
the fi nal question listed above relates to the usefulness of a forecast to 
a decision maker. It concerns the directional accuracy of the forecast. 
Merton (1981), in analyzing fi nancial forecasts, indicates that they have 
value if the signs of the predicted and actual changes are similar. The 
various tests that have been implemented seek to determine whether 
the sign of the forecast change is probabilistically independent of the 
actual change. If the hypothesis that the forecasts are independent of 
the observed events is rejected, then the forecasts can be said to have 
value. 
Schnader and Stekler (1990) provide another interpretation of 
this test. We argue that testing whether the forecasts have value is the 
same as determining whether (in the sense of predicting the direction 
of change) the forecast differs signifi cantly from a naive model that 
continuously predicts up (down). The profession now categorizes the 
various tests as measuring directional accuracy. This concept can be 
( )
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illustrated either when GDP or infl ation predictions are made separately 
or when both variables are examined together.
One variable
Most macroeconomic forecast evaluations focus on GDP and in-
fl ation. Basically, when the real GDP and infl ation forecasts are each 
evaluated separately, they are grouped into two categories. The GNP/
GDP forecasts are categorized according to whether GDP growth was 
positive or negative, and the infl ation categories depend on whether in-
fl ation increased or decreased.5 A 2 × 2 contingency table is created that 
compares the predicted outcome of a variable with the actual outcome 
of that variable (Table 6.1).6  
For notation we have a total of N observations where for n1 of them 
both the actual and the predicted are positive and for n2 of them both 
the actual and the predicted are negative. We have n observations where 
the predicted outcome is positive and N − n observations where the 
predicted outcome is negative (or zero). We also have N1 observations 
where the actual outcome is positive and N2 = N – N1 observations 
where the actual outcome is negative (or zero). The Pesaran-Timmerman 
(1992) statistic along with the chi-square and Fisher’s exact test can be 
used to test this hypothesis.7
The Pesaran-Timmermann statistic for predictive performance for an 
m × m contingency table with a total of N observations is 
NOTE: N = total number of observations; N1 = number of observations where the 
actual change was positive; N2 = number of observations where the actual change 
was negative. Small n’s represent the same variables but refer to predicted changes. 
Blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
Table 6.1  The Relationship between Predicted and Actual Outcomes
Actual outcome
Predicted outcome > 0 ≤ 0
∆Y > 0 n1 N2 − n2 n
≤ 0 N1 − n1 n2 N − n
N1 N2 N
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where NnP ii /ˆ 00  .
 NnP ii /ˆ 00  , 
where 0in  and in0  represent the ith row and column totals, respectively. 
Pesaran and Timmermann (1992) present their results based on the 
square of this test statistic in order to more easily compare it to the 
chi-square goodness of fi t statistic. This test statistic has a chi-square 
distribution with one degree of freedom. 
Several variables
All of the questions discussed above were concerned with evalu-
ating the forecasts of one variable at a time. However, in preparing a 
particular macroeconomic forecast, individuals are concerned with the 
outlook for both the growth rate and the rate of infl ation. The accu-
racy of this overall forecast thus depends on how well both variables 
are predicted simultaneously. Thus, it is necessary to use a different 
contingency table for evaluating the directional accuracy of these mac-
roeconomic forecasts. Sinclair, Stekler, and Kitzinger (2010) show that 
the simultaneous directional accuracy of the two variables can be evalu-
ated by using a 4 × 4 contingency table rather than the 2 × 2 table that 
had been used in assessing each variable individually.8
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In the expanded 4 × 4 table, instead of simply being categorized 
based on the separate GDP growth or infl ation predictions, forecasts 
about the state of the economy are grouped into four categories: 1) GDP 
growth positive, infl ation increasing; 2) GDP growth positive, infl a-
tion decreasing; 3) GDP growth negative, infl ation increasing; and 
4) GDP growth negative, infl ation decreasing. The statistical tests are 
generalized versions of those used when the forecasts were analyzed 
separately.9 Table 6.2 illustrates a 4 × 4 contingency table when the 
directional accuracy of the GDP growth and infl ation forecasts of the 
Federal Reserve are evaluated jointly.
Test statistics
The statistical methodology tests whether or not the forecasts pre-
dict the associated directions of change. There are at least three test 
statistics th at can be used to test the hypothesis that the forecasts fail to 
predict the observed events.10 Two test statistics focus on independence. 
These test statistics are the chi-square and Fisher’s exact test. The 
Pesaran-Timmermann (1992) statistic specifi cally focuses on predictive 
failure. The forecasts are said to have value only if the null hypothesis 
of predictive failure is rejected. Pesaran and Timmermann’s predictive-
failure test is particularly useful in the case where we undertake a joint 
evaluation of GDP growth and infl ation forecasts. Their test does not 
require that the two forecasts be independent of each other. Since output 
and infl ation may be predicted from the same forecasting model, this 
is an important consideration. In this particular case, the probability of 
the pattern of these forecasts occurring by chance is less than 0.001. 











ΔGDP > 0, Δinf > 0 49 13 1 1
ΔGDP > 0, Δinf ≤ 0 7 43 0 4
ΔGDP ≤ 0, Δinf > 0 1 2 4 2
ΔGDP ≤ 0, Δinf ≤ 0 0 3 5 4
SOURCE: Sinclair, Stekler, and Kitzinger (2010).
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Sinclair, Stekler, and Kitzinger (2010) thus conclude that the Fed fore-
casts for the current quarter yield an accurate view of the state of the 
economy. 
Policy Forecast Errors: An Example
In general, to obtain a quantitative measure of the economic costs 
of forecast errors, the decision rule of the user of the prediction must be 
known, but it generally is not known. However, there is at least one case 
where the cost of forecast errors can be measured without knowing an 
explicit decision rule because there is another criterion for evaluating 
forecasts: are fi nancial market and betting market decisions based on 
those forecasts profi table (Leitch and Tanner 1991)? 
Macroeconomic forecasts, however, cannot be evaluated in this 
way, because there is no generally acceptable way of calculating their 
value to policymakers. There is an exception if the rule guiding policy 
decisions is known. Sinclair et al. (2009) show that it is possible to eval-
uate the quantitative forecasts of the Federal Reserve within the context 
of the Taylor Rule, which is assumed to be the one that guides the Fed 
in setting monetary policy.11 The assumption is that the Fed’s forecasts 
of multiple series are usually generated for a specifi c policy purpose, as 
inputs for monetary policy. In this case, an assessment of the quality of 
the quantitative forecasts of two or more variables depends on the rela-
tive importance of each to the Fed.
Specifi cally, let ,
f
t t hP   be a policy decision at time t that is a lin-
ear function of the h-step-ahead forecasts of N ≥ 1 variables
,( ,
f
i t hx   i = 1,...N). The superscript f indicates that the policy decision is based on forecasts rather than on the actual outcomes of the variables: 
 
(6.5) , 1, ,( ,... )
f f f
t t h t h N t hP p x x   .  
If policymakers had perfect foresight, the policy decision would 
simply be Pt , without the superscript f :
(6.6) Pt,t+h = p(x1,t+h ,...xN,t+h) . 
However, because policy is based on forecasts, rather than on the 
actual data, policy is subject to errors that are functions of the mistakes 
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made in forecasting the underlying variables xi,t , i = 1,...N. The differ-ence between the actual policy and the policy that would have been 







htthttt xxpxxpPPPFE    
 
 
,...( ,,1 htNht eee  ) ,
where ,... ,,1 htNht ee   are the forecast errors associated with the individ-ual series. Thus the PFE is composed of the individual forecast errors 
weighted by their importance in the policy rule. According to the 
forward-looking Taylor rule,12 the Fed sets a target federal funds rate,
Tf
ti , based on Equation (6.8), where, as above, the superscript f denotes 
that the target is based on forecast variables.13 The Fed’s policy decision 
)( ,
f
httP   is written as
(6.8) , * 0.5( *) 0.5( *)
f Tf f f f
t t h t t h t h t hP i r y y            ,
 
where r* is the equilibrium real interest rate, π* is the Fed’s implicit 
infl ation rate target, and y* is the potential output growth rate.14
The actual outcome in period t + h, however, may differ from the 
Fed’s forecasts. Therefore, if the members of the FOMC had known the 
actual values for t + h and yt + h (i.e., if they had perfect forecasts or per-
fect foresight), they would have chosen a (potentially different) federal 
funds rate. Consequently, their policy decision under perfect foresight 
)( , httP  would have been 
(6.9) , *
T
t t h tP i r     0.5( *) 0.5( *)
A A A
t h t h t hy y        ,
where At h   and 
A
hty  represent the actual realizations of t + h and yt + h . 
The difference between iTf and iT measures the difference in the federal 
funds rate that occurs because of inaccurate forecasts of output growth 
and infl ation and thus represents the Federal Reserve’s policy forecast 
error, PFEt :
(6.10)     1.5 0.5üüüt t t t h t h t h t hPFE i i y y          . 
The differences,  f htA ht    and  f htA ht yy   , are the Fed’s fore-
cast errors for the infl ation rate and real output growth, respectively. 
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Given the PFEs, the evaluation procedures are similar to those used in 
judging individual forecast errors. 
Using this methodology, Sinclair et al. (2009) were able to evalu-
ate the impact that forecast errors had on the Fed’s monetary policy 
as characterized by the Taylor rule. They found that the Fed’s policy 
forecast error was in general unbiased and signifi cantly smaller than 
the errors that would have resulted from naive forecasts, but not always 
signifi cantly smaller than the errors that would have resulted from the 
SPF predictions. Nevertheless, the mean absolute policy forecast error 
of the Fed forecasts was approximately 1 percent (100 basis points).
FINDINGS FROM FORECAST EVALUATIONS (OF GDP 
GROWTH AND INFLATION)
There have been many studies that have reported on the accuracy 
of the forecasts of the growth of GDP and infl ation. I have been in-
volved in two survey papers that have summarized and synthesized the 
results of these studies. One looks at U.S. and U.K. forecasts (Fildes 
and Stekler 2002). The other does a similar analysis of the G7 (exclud-
ing the U.S.) predictions (Stekler 2008). By comparing the forecasts of 
various countries, we can determine whether the fi ndings are robust. 
The focus will be on fi ve topics: 1) directional errors; 2) biases and 
systematic errors; 3) the magnitude of the errors; 4) the source of the 
errors; and 5) the trend, if any, in forecast accuracy.
Directional Errors
There are very few analyses about directional errors, because most 
forecast evaluations focus on the magnitude of the quantitative errors. 
However, Fildes and Stekler (2002) note that most U.S. and U.K. reces-
sions were not predicted in advance, but neither did economists make 
many predictions of peaks that did not occur.15 In a more recent study, 
Sinclair, Stekler, and Kitzinger (2010) analyze the directional accuracy 
of the Fed’s forecasts of GDP and infl ation and show that the predic-
tions of increases and decreases in the infl ation rate are not associated 
with the actual changes in that rate. When, however, the directional ac-
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curacy of the GDP and infl ation predictions were analyzed jointly, on 
average the Fed’s forecasts for the current quarter and the one-quarter-
ahead period yielded an accurate view of the state of the economy. 
The record for other countries is no better. The turning points in Ger-
man GDP were not predicted, but the accelerations and decelerations of 
the growth rate were forecast accurately. (Stekler [2008] summarizes 
the literature relating to the forecasts of the G7 countries and indicates 
that the results apply equally to private forecasters, research institutes, 
and international organizations.) The evidence suggests that forecasters 
are not able to predict turning points in advance and may even have dif-
fi culty in detecting them quickly once they have occurred.
Biases and Systematic Errors
Most evaluations examine the rationality and effi ciency of the pre-
dictions in order to determine whether they could have been improved. 
Stekler (2002) reviews a large number of studies and concludes that 
there is no defi nitive evidence that the U.S. infl ation forecasts display 
weak-form informational effi ciency. While more of the U.S. growth 
forecasts did not reject the null of informational effi ciency, these results 
were also mixed.16 The results were dependent on the database that was 
examined, the years that were examined, and the methodology that was 
employed. However, most of these analyses did not test whether the 
forecasts were truly ineffi cient or whether the errors could be attribut-
able to asymmetric loss functions.
Forecasters also made systematic errors. They overestimated the rate 
of growth during slowdowns and underestimated it during recoveries 
and booms. Similarly, infl ation was underpredicted when it was rising 
and overpredicted when it was declining. (See the surveys of Fildes and 
Stekler [2002] and Stekler [2008] for the specifi c studies from which 
these results were obtained.) Fildes and Stekler conclude, “These errors 
occurred when the economy was subject to major perturbations, just the 
time when accurate forecasts were most needed” (p.442).
Magnitude of the Errors
Although these qualitative fi ndings about directional and system-
atic errors are important to our understanding the forecasting process, 
up11mhaiefch6.indd   117 11/17/2011   3:04:58 PM
118   Stekler
most evaluations have also provided quantitative estimates of these er-
rors. Fildes and Stekler (2002) report that the mean absolute error of 
annual U.S. and U.K. GDP growth forecasts is around 1 percent. Newer 
studies have found similar results for the G7 countries, but previously 
Öller and Barot (2000) had found that the errors were larger for some of 
the other European countries (Stekler 2008). 
When quarterly GDP estimates were examined, the previous papers 
did not all use identical procedures for calculating the mean absolute 
errors.17 Consequently, our fi ndings are not as complete. We do know 
that there is a substantial improvement in accuracy when the forecast-
ing task switches from predicting what will happen in the next quarter 
to estimating the level of activity in the current quarter. This is largely 
attributable to the availability of actual data for the current period.
The infl ation forecasts seem to have improved. The earlier U.S. in-
fl ation forecasts had mean absolute errors between 1.0 and 1.4 percent, 
but Stekler’s (2008) survey of G7 forecasts shows that those errors are 
now between 0.5 and 0.75 percent. The reduction may be attributable 
to the lower infl ation rates that have been observed in the past several 
decades.
Have the Forecasts Improved?
Given the number of papers that have evaluated macroeconomic 
forecasts, it is surprising how few have asked whether the quality of 
the predictions has improved over time. The problem is not the lack 
of data, for we have 40 years’ worth of forecasts for some countries. 
However, the fi ndings of those studies that have examined this issue 
are contradictory, and thus there are no defi nitive conclusions. For ex-
ample, Heilemann and Stekler (2003) examine German forecasts and 
adjust the errors for the diffi culties in predicting the relevant periods, 
but the results are mixed. Dopke and Fritsche (2006) also look at Ger-
man forecasts and suggest that accuracy may have improved. As for the 
predictions of international organizations, Vogel (2007) shows that the 
accuracy of the OECD forecasts has improved, but Timmerman (2007) 
indicates that the quality of the International Monetary Fund forecasts 
has deteriorated. These fi ndings are consistent with those summarized 
by Fildes and Stekler (2002). We conclude that despite all the resources 
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that have been devoted to forecasting, there is no clear evidence that 
accuracy has improved.
This fi nding suggests that we may have reached the limits of 
forecastability. Heilemann and Stekler (2003) have investigated this 
hypothesis. We calculated the ex post forecast errors generated by simu-
lations obtained from econometric models. These models can serve as a 
benchmark of the maximum accuracy that is attainable because they are 
free from errors caused by wrong assumptions about the predetermined 
variables and the inability to capture the dynamics of multiperiod fore-
casts. We fi nd that the model’s infl ation errors are very similar to those 
that were made ex ante for the same period. This result indicates that 
the accuracy of the infl ation forecasts could not have been improved 
substantially. On the other hand, the model’s growth rate errors are sub-
stantially smaller than the ex ante errors, suggesting that the quality of 
the ex ante real-sector forecasts can still be improved.
Sources of Error: Recessions
A model-based forecast can be decomposed into various sources. 
The forecast depends upon the econometric specifi cation, the exoge-
nous variables and the corresponding predictions of these variables, and 
any adjustment that the economist makes to the model output. There are 
analytical diffi culties associated with determining why each of these 
errors occurred. One example of this diffi culty occurs when econome-
tricians make assumptions about the exogenous variables rather than 
model adjustments to subjectively infl uence their forecasts. 
Nevertheless, there is agreement that recessions are a signifi cant 
cause of some of these errors. A large portion of GDP forecast errors 
are attributable to the failure to predict the occurrence of recessions. 
If recessions and booms are caused by events such as changes in asset 
prices that, it is assumed, cannot be predicted, then the recessions are 
themselves unforecastable. Fair (2009) fi nds that, ex post, some reces-
sions could be predicted even if some key exogenous asset variables 
were estimated using only baseline paths.18 The failure to adequately 
predict the other recessions could be explained by the inability to esti-
mate some or all of these key exogenous variables.
up11mhaiefch6.indd   119 11/17/2011   3:04:59 PM
120   Stekler
What Have We Learned?
The evidence about the macro forecasts that has been presented 
here is very robust.19 The fi ndings of Fildes and Stekler (2002) that 
primarily related only to U.S. and U.K. forecasters are similar to those 
relating to the G7 economists. Both types of studies fi nd that recessions 
are not predicted in advance and account for a signifi cant portion of the 
quantitative errors. Neither type of study is able to show that forecast 
accuracy had improved, and both fi nd that there were systematic errors. 
There may be a quantitative limit beyond which forecast accuracy can-
not be improved (Heilemann and Stekler 2003).
Finally, we now have a somewhat better understanding of the fore-
casting process. We have learned that forecasts for a horizon longer 
than 12–18 months might not be valuable (Isiklar and Lahiri 2007; 
Vuchelen and Gutierrez 2005). We also know more about the causes of 
bias. Batchelor (2007) shows how the systematic errors or “biases” are 
related to the forecasters’ optimism (or pessimism) and conservatism in 
revising their predictions. He notes that standard rationality tests are not 
appropriate if there has been a structural break. The pattern of the errors 
can then provide a way of understanding the forecasters’ learning pro-
cess about the impact of this structural break. Isiklar and Lahiri (2007) 
use forecast revisions to explain the behavioral characteristics of fore-
casters—i.e., how do they react to news and when is news important?20 
We know that there is much more work to be done in determining the 
importance of asymmetric losses, the sources of biases, the limits of 
accuracy, etc. Much can be learned about the sources of error if we un-
dertake more studies like Heilemann’s (2002).
LABOR MARKET FORECASTS
We now turn to a discussion of labor market forecasts. There are 
many fewer studies of these types of forecasts. Consequently, our re-
sults will be less informative. Before I discuss the results of evaluations 
of the forecasts of these variables, I want to briefl y note that several 
labor market series are used as indicators or predictors about the over-
all state of the economy. These are outlined in the next section. Next 
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I consider the short-run quantitative forecasts of the U.S. unemploy-
ment rate. Finally, I consider long-run projections and the procedures 
for evaluating them. I also show that the methodology for evaluating 
long-run labor market forecasts can be used to analyze other types of 
long-run projections.
Labor Market Series as Indicators
The U.S. unemployment rate moves countercyclically and may dis-
play an asymmetric relationship with changes in GDP. It may have a 
short lead (or be coincident) at business cycle peaks, but it lags at the 
troughs (Montgomery et al. 1998). The unemployment rate is not con-
sidered either a leading or a coincident indicator. There are, however, 
two other series that are considered leading indicators of cyclical move-
ments and one series that is considered a coincident indicator. These 
are series that are included in the various indicator indexes currently 
compiled and published by the Conference Board.
The two leading series are 1) average weekly hours in manufac-
turing and 2) average weekly claims for unemployment insurance.21 
While Diebold and Rudebusch (1989, 1991) have evaluated the com-
posite leading indicators, I have found only one paper that examined 
the forecasting behavior of either of those series—Seip and McNown 
(2007). Seip and McNown examined the behavior of average weekly 
hours, but their analysis produced contradictory fi ndings. For example, 
they examined the Granger causality between movements in the weekly 
hours series and changes in the Federal Reserve Board Index of Indus-
trial Production. Their results show that the hours series is a lagging 
indicator with respect to the Index of Production, which is a coincident 
indicator. On the other hand, using sophisticated phase analysis, they 
fi nd that the timing at turning points suggests that it is a leading indica-
tor, but not that accurate of one.
It is possible that there may be another labor market series that 
could be a leading indicator. The offi cial U.S. unemployment rate series 
is not the only measure of labor slack in the economy; the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor also compiles other measures of unemployment. The 
offi cial or conventional unemployment rate is called U3 and measures 
the total number of unemployed persons as a percentage of the civilian 
labor force. The broadest BLS measure of unemployment is called U6. 
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It includes two additional categories: 1) people who have left the labor 
force because they have become discouraged at failing to fi nd employ-
ment and 2) individuals who are working part time but would prefer to 
be full-time employees.
The difference between the two rates, therefore, represents the 
degree of labor underutilization that is not captured by the traditional 
unemployment rate. Figure 6.1 displays the difference between the U6 
and U3 series and seems to indicate that this difference becomes larger 
before the cyclical turns of the U.S. business cycles for the period 
1970–2009. The NBER-dated recessions are shaded. However, there 
has been no rigorous and systematic evaluation of this series to deter-
mine whether, in fact, this series is an adequate leading indicator.
The Conference Board also compiles and publishes a composite 
index of coincident series. The movements in this index roughly track 
the cyclical movements of the economy. There are four series in this 
composite index, with “employees on nonagricultural payrolls” repre-
senting the labor market. We should note the importance of using labor 
market data for forecasting cyclical movements, but the procedures for 
evaluating these time series as indicators are beyond the scope of this 
chapter.
Modeling and Forecasting the Unemployment Rate
Neftçi (1984) fi nds that the U.S. unemployment rate has an in-
teresting characteristic: it displays asymmetric behavior because the 
probability of a decline following two previous declines differs from 
the probability of an increase given two prior increases. This suggests 
that a linear model would not adequately explain the behavior of this 
series. Subsequently, a number of univariate nonlinear models were de-
veloped to explain and then forecast this series.22 More recently, Milas 
and Rothman (2008) go one step further by developing multivariate 
nonlinear models to explain the U.S. unemployment rate.
Only a small number of these nonlinear models have actually been 
used to forecast the U.S. unemployment rate. Rothman (1998) uses 
six models and, based on out-of-sample recursive simulations, con-
cludes that their performance is better than that of a linear model.23 
Montgomery et al. (1998) undertake a more comprehensive evaluation. 
They use a threshold autoregressive (TAR) model to generate simulated 
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recursive forecasts. These forecasts displayed smaller errors than were 
generated by the linear ARIMA model. Moreover, although no formal 
statistical tests were used, the forecasts of the TAR model appeared 
to be unbiased. Similarly, neural network models (Moshiri and Brown 
2004) and nonparametric nonlinear models (Golan and Perloff 2004) 
were superior to linear models in forecasting the unemployment rate. 
In fact, Golan and Perloff indicate that their model is superior to the 
nonlinear TAR model. 
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that any of these models will become 
the standard methodology for forecasting the unemployment rate. The 


















Figure 6.1  Difference between U6 and U3, 1970–2009
NOTE: U3 = The percentage of U.S. workers unemployed according to the conven-
tional measure. U6 = The percentage of those people plus two other categories: 
1) people who have left the labor force because they became discouraged at not fi nd-
ing work and 2) people working part time who would prefer to be working full time. 
The NBER-dated recessions are shaded.
SOURCE: Dougherty (2009).
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parametric nonlinear models. In addition, Golan and Perloff fi nd that 
the Michigan structural model also generated smaller errors.
Given these results, it is appropriate to also report some fi ndings 
about nonmodel forecasts of the unemployment rate. The median SPF 
forecast was not only more accurate than the model predictions, but it 
was also superior to the Federal Reserve’s Greenbook estimates for the 
period 1983–2004 (Baghestani 2008). The SPF errors are asymmetric, 
with mean errors during expansions amounting to less than 0.1 per-
cent, while during recessions those errors sometimes exceed 1.0 percent 
(Montgomery et al. 1998). The Greenbook estimates are unbiased, but 
the errors are also asymmetric (Sinclair, Stekler, and Joutz 2008). 
There is additional information about the quality of nonmodel un-
employment rate forecasts. Carroll (2003) notes that the SPF forecasts 
were more accurate than those obtained from the Michigan Household 
Surveys (MHS). The MHS eventually did update its forecasts to con-
form to those of the professional forecasters. Professional forecasters’ 
estimates of the unemployment rate were also consistent with Okun’s 
Law, given their predictions of the change in real GDP (Pierdzioch, 
Rülke, and Stadtmann 2011).
These results suggest that we economists recognize the asymmetric 
behavior of the unemployment rate but have not yet been able to de-
velop an appropriate model that captures the asymmetries better than 
our judgment does.
Long-Term Labor Market Forecasts: Methodology
The Bureau of Labor Statistics makes long-run projections of a 
number of variables. The variables include the size of the labor force, 
employment by industry, and employment by occupation. Because the 
projections are for a horizon of 10 or more years, they may be evaluated 
differently from analyses of short-term macroeconomic predictions. 
For example, an evaluation of these BLS long-term projections poses 
three methodological issues that usually are not encountered in analyses 
of short-term macroeconomic forecasts. 
First, no other organization made projections of these variables. 
Consequently, there is no benchmark for judging the BLS forecasts. 
Second, these projections are long-term, not the short-term macroeco-
nomic forecasts that have been evaluated in the past. Thus, the questions 
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that must be addressed in such an evaluation can differ from those 
addressed in the macro forecasts. Finally, such a projection is a one-
time forecast.24 I will illustrate these issues with an example and show 
how the labor-force, employment-by-industry, and occupation projec-
tions that BLS made in 1989 for the year 2000 were evaluated (Stekler 
and Thomas 2005). Although these forecasts had already been evalu-
ated individually (Fullerton 2003), it was possible both to ask additional 
questions that had not been addressed in earlier studies and to use eval-
uation methodologies different from those employed previously.
Benchmarks
There are no other forecasts that are comparable to the BLS pro-
jections; it is, therefore, necessary to construct a benchmark for the 
projections of each variable. In each case, BLS projections are com-
pared with similar data obtained from the forecasts of these benchmarks. 
The benchmarks that were selected all use data that were available at 
the time when the BLS projections were prepared. In actuality, the 
benchmarks are taken from one of two naive models that are either 
1) projecting the latest available information or 2) predicting that the 
change over the forecast period is equal to that observed over the previ-
ous time interval, which is of the same length as the forecast period.25 
The projections that are being analyzed in this article were prepared in 
1988; thus the forecast period is 12 years in length. Consequently, the 
change from 1976 to 1988 was used as the benchmark here. At a mini-
mum, the BLS projections should be more accurate than the forecasts 
of these naive models.
Questions in evaluating long-term projections versus short-
term forecasts
The questions that are appropriate for evaluating the short-term 
forecasts have been examined in detail, but the questions that should 
be asked in analyzing longer-run projections have not been given the 
same degree of attention. Because BLS projections primarily focus on 
long-run trends, the questions asked and the statistics used in evaluat-
ing these forecasts should be related to the primary emphasis of the 
forecast. 
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Thus, the two basic questions to be asked in evaluating these pro-
jections are as follows:
1) Have the trends, specifi cally structural changes, been predicted 
correctly? and
2) Were these forecasts better than those that could have been pro-
duced by a benchmark method?
Additional questions concerning the sources of the errors and 
whether the forecasts improved over time can also be posed. 
The statistics that can answer these questions include the following 
four:
1) the percentage of components where the direction of change 
was predicted correctly;
2) dissimilarity indexes that measure the structure of the labor 
force;
3) contingency tables that determine whether the actual and pre-
dicted directions of change are related; and
4) Spearman’s rank correlation coeffi cients, which measure the 
relationship between the predicted and actual changes in the 
components of an aggregate forecast. 
Questions about the labor force projection are listed in Table 6.3.26 
These include the following four:
1) What is the projected size of the labor force, by age and gender?
2) What is the growth rate of the labor force?
3) What are the participation rates of the various groups? and
4) What is the distribution of the total labor force by age and 
gender?
The error measures that were used in evaluating these projections 
are also presented in Table 6.3. They include the direction of error, the 
absolute and percentage error, the dissimilarity index, etc. The limita-
tions of these questions and statistics are also noted.
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Measuring structural change: dissimilarity indexes 
In order to determine whether the structural changes and major 
trends that occurred between 1988 and 2000 were predicted accurately, 
a statistic is used that directly addresses this question. The forecast of 
the total labor force is an aggregated estimate, and it is important to also 
examine the disaggregated component predictions. Such an analysis en-
ables one to determine whether the structure of the aggregate has been 
predicted accurately—i.e., whether the distribution of the labor force 
across various categories is accurate.
If the aggregate, X, is predicted according to some scenario (for 
example, full employment), one would want to determine whether 
the structure is accurate even if the total is wrong. Kolb and Stekler 
(1992) developed a procedure for decomposing the total error into two 
components, where the fi rst measures the scenario discrepancy and the 
second the structural error. They calculated the proportion of the aggre-
gate predicted and actual totals that were associated with each of the i 
components. While their analysis was based on an information-content 
statistic, using dissimilarity indexes would yield the same result. 
A dissimilarity index is a statistic that can be used to determine 
whether one distribution approximates another one. Specifi cally, it 
measures the amount by which the forecasted distribution would have 
to change to be identical to the actual distribution. The formula for the 
dissimilarity index is 
(6.11) D = 0.5 ∑ | (Pfi  / Pf ) − (Pai / Pa) | , 
where Pfi  is the forecast proportion of the labor force that will be in the 
ith group, and Pf is the forecast for the total labor force. Similarly, Pai 
and Pa are the corresponding actual data. D is bounded in the interval 
of 0 to 100 percent. The smaller the value of D, the smaller the differ-
ence between the predicted and actual distributions—that is, the more 
accurate the forecast.
The dissimilarity index for the BLS labor force projections was 
based on the 14 age/gender categories that had been used in 1989 to 
prepare the estimates for 2000. Similar dissimilarity indexes were 
constructed for the other distributions that serve as standards of com-
parison. The values of the various dissimilarity indexes are presented 
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Questions Accuracy measure
Problem with 
measure or question New question or measure
What is the size of the total 
labor force?
Mean absolute error; 
percentage error; direction 
of error
Does not distinguish between 
census population errors and 
participation rate errors; 
no standard of comparison
How much of total labor 
force error is the result of 
participation rate errors? 
Standard of comparison: 
1988 participation rates
What is the size of the labor 
force by gender?
Mean absolute error; 
percentage error; direction 
of error
Same as total labor force Same as total labor force
What is the growth rate of
the total labor force?
Error in percentage points Same as total labor force How much of the error in 
the growth rate forecast is 
the result of participation 
rate errors? Standard 
of comparison: 1988 
participation rates
What are the participation 
rates of total labor force?
Of men? Of women?
By age and sex?
Error in percentage points,
or absolute error/
participation rate; mean 
absolute percentage error
Does not indicate whether 
direction of change in 
participation rate was 
predicted; no standard of 
comparison
Were the directions of 
change in the participation 
rates accurately predicted? 
Standard of comparison: 
number of changes accurately 
predicted vs. predictions by 
chance (binomial,  p = 0.5)
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What is the distribution of the 
labor force by age and sex?
— No standard of comparison Comparison standard: 
dissimilarity index based on 
1988 distribution
NOTE: — = no established accuracy measure.
SOURCE: Stekler and Thomas (2005).
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in Appendix Table 6A.3. The benchmarks were the projections based 
on various estimates of the population and alternative estimates of the 
participation rates.
The results are mixed. In some cases, the dissimilarity indexes ob-
tained from the BLS projections are smaller (and thus more accurate) 
than those of the standards of comparison. In other cases, the opposite 
results were obtained. However, the dissimilarity index for the actual 
BLS forecast never exceeds 2 percent for any age/gender category or 
for men or women separately. The values of the dissimilarity indexes 
of the standards of comparison were comparable. While there is no 
statistical distribution for the dissimilarity index, the BLS projection 
substantially predicted the structural changes that occurred in the labor 
force between 1988 and 2000. On the other hand, similar results were 
obtained from the naive models that served as the benchmarks.
Similar procedures were used to evaluate the employment-by-
industry and occupational projections. The BLS employment and naive 
projections were again similar, but the BLS occupational estimates were 
more accurate than the naive benchmark. Stekler and Thomas (2005) 
conclude that the accuracy of the BLS projections are comparable to the 
estimates obtained from naive extrapolative methods.
The applicability of the long-term evaluation methodology
The methodology that was applied in evaluating the BLS long-
term projections has not been widely used. I want to show that it has 
a wider applicability by evaluating some long-run census population 
projections. One benefi t of this analysis is the existence of multiple pro-
jections for a given date, permitting us to determine how the accuracy 
changes with a reduction in the forecast horizon.
The Census Bureau makes periodic forecasts of the population of 
the United States 5, 10, or more years into the future. These forecasts 
are both for the total U.S. population and for the number of inhabitants 
of each of the states. There have been many evaluations of these state 
forecasts (e.g., Campbell 2002; Smith and Sincich 1990, 1992; Wang 
2002). In all cases, the error measures were based on the magnitude 
of the discrepancies between the projected and actual state population 
fi gures.
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In addition to statistics that measure the quantitative errors, one 
can use the methodology that was applied to the BLS projections for 
these census data. One of the purposes of a long-range projection of 
each state’s population is to provide a picture of the distribution of the 
aggregate U.S. population among the various states. If one were only 
interested in knowing whether the projections captured the important 
trends that actually occurred, one might not be concerned with the mag-
nitude of the errors. The accuracy of the quantitative projections of each 
state’s total population is then not as relevant.
It is possible that the share of the nation’s population that was in 
each state was predicted correctly, but that the national total and the 
estimates for each of the states were inaccurate by the same proportion. 
In that case, the projected distribution of the state populations would 
have exactly matched the observed distribution. Thus, the evaluation 
procedure that is suggested here does not focus on the specifi c numbers 
in the projections or the magnitude of the misestimates. Rather, this 
evaluation asks whether the projected share of the total U.S. population 
by state was similar to the actual distribution. Such an analysis enables 
one to determine whether the state distribution of the aggregate popula-
tion was accurate even if the aggregate estimate is inaccurate.
Decomposing the errors. Assume that atx  is the actual aggregate 
population of the United States at time t and ftx  is the aggregate value 
that was projected for time t. The error in the aggregate projection is 
(6.12)  a ft t te x x  .    
                           
In addition, it is possible to examine the errors associated with the 
population projections for each of the i states. Accordingly, the pro-
portions of the forecasted ( fi) and actual (ai) aggregated population 
associated with each of the i states are
, ,( )
f f
i t i t tx f x  ;        . ,( ) ;
a a
i t i t tx a x         ∑ fi,t = 1;        ∑ ai,t = 1 ;          
                  
and the forecast error for each state is  
(6.14)  , , ,( ) ( )
a f
i t i t t i t te a x f x  .     
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If the aggregate forecast is absolutely accurate, the quantitative er-
ror for each state would be
(6.15)  , , , ,( )
a
i t i t i t i te a f x   , 
                                 
which is the difference between the actual and forecast proportions of 
the aggregate population in each state. The same holds true if the ag-
gregate forecast is inaccurate. If a ft tx x , 
(6.16)  , , , ,( ) ( )
a a f
i t i t i t t i t t te a f x f x x    .  
                            
Thus the quantitative forecast error for each state, ei,t , is the sum 
of two components. The fi rst represents the error in predicting the pro-
portion of the population in each state. The second measures the error 
in failing to predict the aggregate correctly. In order to evaluate these 
long-term population forecasts, we will focus on the fi rst term, using the 
dissimilarity measure as our statistic.
The alternative methodology (benchmark) in this case is a naive 
model, because a valid forecasting procedure should be as accurate as 
this type of model. In this case, we assume that the naive projection 
of the states’ shares of the U.S. population for year t + h is identical to 
the known distribution that is available from either the census count or 
from the population estimate in year t, the year from which the projec-
tion was extended.
Data. We evaluate the census state population projections that were 
made between 1970 and 1996 for the years 1975–2005.27 There are 
seven such sets of projections. The length of the forecasting horizon 
varied between 2 and 25 years. The naive projections were made using 
the same starting points and horizons. These projections were compared 
either with the actual census counts for 1980, 1990, and 2000 or with 
the population estimates that the Census Bureau made for 1975, 1985, 
1995, and 2005.
Results. The dissimilarity indexes derived from both the census 
and naive projections are presented in Table 6.4. The longer the pro-
jection horizon, the larger the size of the dissimilarity index that was 
associated with the projections—i.e., the less accurate the projected 
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distribution. This result is similar to fi ndings about the relationship 
between quantitative errors and the length of the horizon in short-run 
forecasts. As indicated above, the size of these indexes measures the 
amount by which the projected distribution would have to change to be 
identical to the actual distribution. This ranged from less than 1 percent 
for the very short projections to more than 5 percent for some of the 
longer horizons. 
Moreover, the projections seem to have improved over time. For the 
fi ve-year projections, the values of the dissimilarity indexes declined 
from more than 1.5 percent to less than 1 percent. The magnitude of the 
index for the ten-year projection made in 1970 was almost 4 percent; 
the similar measurements for the projections made in the late 1980s and 
















 a  6.5
 b  6.4
  [ 0.8]
1975   1.8
[ 2.7]
 3.7
   [0.7]
5.3
   [0.9]
1980  2.5






   [0.3]
1.9
   [0.4]
  2.3
 [0.4]
1988  a  0.6
 b  0.8
   [0.1]
a  2.5
b  1.7
   [0.4]
1992 0.4
   [0.1]
1.4




   [0.2]
  1.2
 [0.3]
NOTE: Numbers in brackets are for naive (benchmark) projections. There were two 
sets of census projections issued in 1970 and 1988. They are denoted “a” and “b.” 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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1990s were all less than 1.5 percent. A similar trend was observed in the 
more recent twenty-year projections.
Nevertheless, the census forecasts associated with the distributions 
of the state population forecasts are inferior to the naive forecasts (Ta-
ble 6.4). In all but one case, the dissimilarity indexes associated with 
the naive forecasts are smaller than the ones derived from the compa-
rable census projections. The exception is the fi ve-year projection made 
in 1975.
CONCLUSIONS
In providing these perspectives on forecast evaluations, I started 
with questions that were posed 20 years ago. While the nomenclature 
may have changed, we still ask the same questions today. On the other 
hand, the statistical and econometric foundations of our analyses have 
been vastly improved, and new methodologies for forecasting have 
been developed. 
Despite all these efforts, there are not many positive results to re-
port about the quality of our forecasting techniques. We do know that 
combining forecasts tends to improve accuracy. We also can test for the 
limits of forecastability and can determine whether we have achieved 
that limit yet.
On the negative side, our results on the question of whether the ac-
curacy of our forecasts has improved over time are ambiguous. We still 
fail to predict turning points, and the short-run forecasts still display bi-
ases and ineffi ciencies. The limited amount of evidence about long-run 
labor market and population projections suggests that, in some dimen-
sions, they are no better than naive models.
However, we should not despair but rather focus on another aspect 
of these results. We still have immense opportunities for productive 
research. Let me suggest a few entries in a laundry list of possible re-
search topics.
• How can we improve our forecasting models?
• Using these models, what are the limits of forecastability?
• How does one predict turning points?
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• Why do economists prefer failing to forecast a turn that occurs 
rather than predicting a turn that does not happen?
• How valuable are indicators?
• Do forecasters have asymmetric loss functions?
• How are expectations (forecasts) formed?
• How do individuals go about making and revising their 
forecasts?
• What are the appropriate techniques for evaluating multivariate 
forecasts?
• For evaluating long-run predictions?
• For evaluating probability forecasts such as those contained in 
fan charts?
• How valuable are market-based (futures) forecasts?
• Finally, to what extent do real-time data problems affect our 
predictive accuracy?
To answer these questions, many more studies, such as those cited 
here, are required. It will obviously take time to answer all of these 
questions, but the results should provide a substantial payoff in in-
creased forecast accuracy.
Notes
1. West (2006) has still another view about forecast evaluation: he argues that these 
evaluations provide inferences about the characteristics of models. Thus the fo-
cus is exclusively on forecasts generated by models, whether in sample or out of 
sample. 
2. In that regard, the aforementioned econometric procedures for conducting evalua-
tions provide a rigorous theoretical methodology for the statistical measures.
3. The mean square error criterion is associated with a quadratic loss function. (See 
Elliott and Timmermann 2008.) Another metric is mean absolute error.
4. This method can also be applied to one forecaster making several forecasts for the 
same horizon. (See Clements, Joutz, and Stekler 2007.)
5. No change is classifi ed with the negative changes. Note that we are focusing on the 
direction of change in the infl ation rate, which is equivalent to measuring accelera-
tions and decelerations of the price level.
6. The contingency table methodology is used to test whether the sign of the pre-
dicted change is probabilistically independent of the sign of the actual change. 
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This is also a test of the hypothesis that the forecasts are more accurate than those 
of a naive random-walk model in predicting the direction of change. (See Stekler 
1994, p. 497.)
7. The chi-square and Fisher’s exact test are well known and are not presented here.
8. Naik and Leuthold (1986) also use a 4 × 4 contingency table in their qualitative 
analysis of forecasting performance. Their study focuses on a different topic—the 
ability to predict turning points. (Also see Kaylen and Brandt 1988.)
9. There is, however, a difference in interpretation once we go beyond the simple 
2 × 2 case. In particular, the 2 × 2 contingency table tests for predictive failure 
of only one variable, whereas the 4 × 4 contingency table tests for predictive fail-
ure of both variables. Moreover, in the 2 × 2 case, the hypothesis of predictive 
failure is equivalent to the hypothesis that the actual and predicted values of the 
variable are independent of each other. As discussed in Pesaran and Timmermann 
(1992), however, for the 4 × 4 case they are no longer equivalent. For our contin-
gency table, independence implies predictive failure, but not vice versa. 
10. Merton (1981) and Henriksson and Merton (1981) use a test based on the hyper-
geometric distribution. This is identical to Fisher’s exact test. Their test assumes 
known row and column frequencies, which is not assumed for the Pesaran-
Timmermann test.
11. The literature assumes that the Taylor rule is an approximation to the decision rule 
of the Fed. Also note that this procedure is in the framework of a decision-based 
forecast evaluation, discussed above.
12. Although Taylor (1993) originally proposed his rule as an empirical description of 
past Fed policy actions, Woodford (2001a,b) has shown that the Taylor rule can 
also be justifi ed based on a fi rm theoretical foundation. 
13. Following Orphanides (2001), we assume that the Fed uses the Greenbook fore-
casts in their decision rule. The members of the FOMC also make their own 
forecasts, but they have access to the staff forecasts of the Greenbook when doing 
so. For an evaluation of those forecasts, see Romer and Romer (2008). 
14. While the output gap is typically used in the Taylor rule, the growth rate is 
typically used in forecast evaluation. The growth rate of the actuals is approxi-
mately ln(Yt) − ln(Yt−1), whereas the growth rate of the forecasts is approximately 
ln( ftY ) − ln(Yt−1). Thus, when we subtract one from the other for the policy forecast 
error, we have ln(Yt) − ln(
f
tY ). Approximating the output gaps in the same manner, 
we have ln(Yt) – ln(Y*) and ln( ftY ) – ln(Y*), so again we have ln(Yt) − ln(
f
tY ). It is 
this result that permits us to use the growth rate in order to construct the PFEs. This 
analysis does assume, however, that potential output, Y*, is known rather than a 
forecast. This assumption is based on the lack of forecasts for this variable in the 
Greenbook. For a discussion of the role of real time output gap estimates and the 
Taylor rule, see Orphanides (2001).  
15. The U.S. false turns predicted in 1978–1979 were an exception, but real GNP did 
decline for two quarters during this period.
16. The U.K. forecasts yielded similar results.
17. Some authors transform the errors into annual growth rates; others do not. 
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18. The exogenous asset variables in the Fair (2009) model are equity prices and hous-
ing prices. His simulations also assumed that import prices and exports as well as 
the asset variables could only be estimated using baseline benchmarks.
19. This summary refers only to the fi ndings mentioned in the text. There are many 
other topics in the forecasting literature that were not reviewed and are beyond the 
scope of this paper. These include the quality of the data (Öller and Teterukovsky 
2007), leading indicators (Allen and Morzuch 2006), and the role of judgmental 
forecasting (Lawrence et al. 2006). In addition, one could investigate the value of 
combining forecasts, the value of data revisions, and the question of which actuals 
to use in conducting an evaluation.
20. In the forecasts made for year t, the most important revisions occur at the end of 
t − 1.
21. The Conference Board has constructed a Composite Leading Index, and these se-
ries are included in that index. They have also been included in earlier composite 
indexes that have been constructed by the U.S. Department of Commerce.
22. Skalin and Teräsvirta (2002) provide a list of studies that have employed nonlinear 
models to estimate unemployment rates. Swanson and White (1997) select models 
based on their ability to predict macroeconomic variables, including the unem-
ployment rate, in real time. Clements and Krolzig (2003) survey the development 
of asymmetric business-cycle models and develop statistical tests but do not apply 
these models to U.S. unemployment data.
23. Pool and Speight (2000) had a similar fi nding for the U.K. and Japanese economies.
24. In most forecast evaluations, there is a time series of forecasts. It is then possible 
to discuss the characteristics of the average forecast. This is not possible with a 
single observation.
25. These benchmarks are identical to the ones used to calculate the U coeffi cients in 
short-run forecast evaluations.
26. The questions about occupation projections and employment are presented in Ap-
pendix Tables 6A.1 and 6A.2.
27. The data were obtained from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Re-
ports, Series P25, Nos. 477, 735, 937, 1017, 1044, 1053, and 1111.
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140Table 6A.1  Questions about Occupational Forecasts
Question Accuracy measure
Problem with question
and/or accuracy measure New question and/or measure
How many people 
will be employed in 
each occupation?
Absolute error; absolute 
percentage error
No standard of comparison; gives 
equal weight to large and small 
occupations
Standard of comparison: naive 




Compare the number of 
occupations projected 
to grow the fastest with 
those that did grow fastest; 
distribution of growth rates 
by growth adjectives
No standard of comparison; 
no analysis of all occupations’ 
projected and actual growth rates
Spearman’s rank correlation 
coeffi cient; standard of comparison 
not possible because of defi nitional 
changes
Which occupations 
will have the largest 
job growth?
Compare the number of 
occupations that were 
projected to have largest 
job growth with those 
that did
No standard of comparison Standard of comparison not possible 
because of defi nitional changes




Absolute percentage error No standard of comparison Dissimilarity index: comparison 
with naive model
up11m
haiefch6.indd   140
up11m
haiefch6.indd   140
11/17/2011   3:05:02 PM
11/17/2011   3:05:02 PM
141
What were the 
sources of errors?
Model simulations None
NOTE: Blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Stekler and Thomas (2005).
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142Table 6A.2  Questions Asked about the Employment-by-Industry Forecasts
Questions Accuracy measure
Problem with
measure or question New question or measure
How many people will be 
employed in each industry?
Percentage error; mean 
absolute percentage error
No standard of comparison; 
gives equal weight to large 
and small industries
Standard of comparison: rates 
of growth equal to previous 
rates of growth; mean 
weighted percentage error
Which industries would 
have the highest (lowest) 
employment growth rates?
Compare the number of 
industries projected to grow 
the fastest (slowest) with 
those that did grow fastest 
(slowest)
No standard of comparison; 
no analysis of all industries’ 
projected and actual growth 
rates
Standard of comparison: 
forecasts of fastest- (slowest-) 
growing industries from naive 
model; Spearman’s rank 
correlation coeffi cient for all 
industries
What is the distribution of 
employment by industry?
Dissimilarity index No standard of comparison Standard of comparison: same 
share as in 1988; shares are 
based on previous growth rates
What were the sources of 
the industry employment 
forecast errors?
Model simulations None
NOTE: Blank = not applicable.
SOURCE: Stekler and Thomas (2005).
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Gender, age 1.83 2.02 2.24 2.32
Men, age 1.63 0.91 0.62 1.37
Women, age 1.91 2.86 2.40 1.32
NOTE: Numbers represent the dissimilarity indexes using alternative standards of 
comparison.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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